After building a theoretical framework for income and output and the rate of return on capital, Thomas Piketty turns to growth: demographic growth and economic growth.
His idea is that the current era shows a bell-curve of growth. It starts with the demographic bulge that started after 1700 and the economic bulge the started after 1800. Obviously, he writes, it's all going to end.
Piketty points out that there were about 600 million humans on the earth in 1700 and 7 billion right now.
Piketty thinks that economic growth is on a similar path. Growth in Europe and North America peaked in 1950-1990 and in the last 20 years from 1990-2012 it has trended lower. The rest of the world will go the same way once it has caught up to the West.
Thus (in a chart on page 100) Piketty forecasts that world per-capita economic growth will peak at 2.5% per capita per year in 2012-2030 and will be down to 1.2% per capita per year by the end of the century.
A world of slow growth, economic and/or demographic, is a world where opportunity to rise is reduced. This means that the world will return to the world of Jane Austen and Balzac novels. Back in those days, before 20th century inflation and modern growth, the average person subsisted on about £30 per year. But the average Austen or Balzac family knew that you needed about £600 to £1,000 a year to live "free from need." Mostly, they inherited their wealth.
In those days, before the modern era, where the population and the economy were both pretty static, inequalities persisted from generation to generation.
In the last century we have see persistent inflation; this has obscured the monetary benchmarks of the pre-inflationary world. But the future is likely to return to something similar, wealth through inheritance rather than wealth through growth, unless we do something about it.
Introduction
Part One: Income and Capital
Income and Output
End of Growth
Part Two: The Dynamics of the Capital/Income Ratio
Changes in Capital
New World Capital and Slavery
Capital/income Ratio in the Long Run
Capital's Share of Income
Part Three: The Structure of Inequality
Inequality and Its Concentration
Two Worlds: France and the US
Inequality of Labor Income
Inequality of Capital Ownership
Merit and Inheritance in the Long Run
Global Inequality of Wealth in the 21st Century
Part Four: Regulating Capital in the Twenty-First Century
A Social State for the 21st Century
Rethinking the Progressive Income Tax
A Global Tax on Capital
The Question of the Public Debt
Conclusion
His idea is that the current era shows a bell-curve of growth. It starts with the demographic bulge that started after 1700 and the economic bulge the started after 1800. Obviously, he writes, it's all going to end.
Piketty points out that there were about 600 million humans on the earth in 1700 and 7 billion right now.
If this pace were to continue for the next three centuries the world's population would exceed 70 billion in 2300.The fact is that the world population growth rate peaked at about 1.8% per year in about 1950-1990, according to a chart on page 80. Now the growth rate is coming down, and it's expected to continue to go down.
Piketty thinks that economic growth is on a similar path. Growth in Europe and North America peaked in 1950-1990 and in the last 20 years from 1990-2012 it has trended lower. The rest of the world will go the same way once it has caught up to the West.
Thus (in a chart on page 100) Piketty forecasts that world per-capita economic growth will peak at 2.5% per capita per year in 2012-2030 and will be down to 1.2% per capita per year by the end of the century.
A world of slow growth, economic and/or demographic, is a world where opportunity to rise is reduced. This means that the world will return to the world of Jane Austen and Balzac novels. Back in those days, before 20th century inflation and modern growth, the average person subsisted on about £30 per year. But the average Austen or Balzac family knew that you needed about £600 to £1,000 a year to live "free from need." Mostly, they inherited their wealth.
In those days, before the modern era, where the population and the economy were both pretty static, inequalities persisted from generation to generation.
In the last century we have see persistent inflation; this has obscured the monetary benchmarks of the pre-inflationary world. But the future is likely to return to something similar, wealth through inheritance rather than wealth through growth, unless we do something about it.
Introduction
Part One: Income and Capital
Income and Output
End of Growth
Part Two: The Dynamics of the Capital/Income Ratio
Changes in Capital
New World Capital and Slavery
Capital/income Ratio in the Long Run
Capital's Share of Income
Part Three: The Structure of Inequality
Inequality and Its Concentration
Two Worlds: France and the US
Inequality of Labor Income
Inequality of Capital Ownership
Merit and Inheritance in the Long Run
Global Inequality of Wealth in the 21st Century
Part Four: Regulating Capital in the Twenty-First Century
A Social State for the 21st Century
Rethinking the Progressive Income Tax
A Global Tax on Capital
The Question of the Public Debt
Conclusion