What is emergentism? Is it a Theory of Everything or a "ghostly last stand for metaphysical mysteries?" Paul Davies thinks that "emergentism is a new scientific paradigm;" Imre Lakatos thinks of it a "progressive research programme," meaning that it is fruitfully combining together in various fields that is "going somewhere and it gaining support on the way."
Clark's notion is that, while emergentism falls short of a unified model of science, at least provides a consistent language "applicable to a whole range of phenomena" with concepts such as "dynamic systems, chaos, complexity, and self organization." It seems to be a comfortable compromise between unified theory and Paul Feyerabend's notion of "anything goes." And that influences the experience of scientific enterprise: not as crystalline, but a human discourse "involving a converging practice and mutual influence between our best theories in science."
And perhaps its very uncertainty and unpredictability brings into question the eternal dream of "ultimate certainties and universal foundational principles" and that is a good thing.
But how emergent and creative is emergence? There are two explanations: the weak explanation is that "living beings [only] appear to be relatively independent of their chemical constituents." Living things are just a consequence of their complexity. The strong explanation is that, say, in the emergence of life, there is something that is "irreducible" to "nonliving entities." Some thinkers limit this to consciousness versus non-consciousness. But Clarke prefers a general idea that we can't reduce new phenomena to its constituents. It is just useful to "make sense of nature as being driven by... a creative principle."
There's a problem with this, that it seems to contradict the idea of entropy, that the universe is running down from order to chaos. The argument is that living things are not like steam engines, but can export disorder into the environment and import order from it. They "dissipate" entropy, or used-up energy, into the environment. According to Ilya Prigogine
such processes of transformation, of self-organization and self-creation, lead to the formation of new system which are not apparently or readily explainable in terms of preceding conditions or constituent microscopic processes.
Thus, "small fluctuations may iterate and kick-start an entirely new transformational process. Such "turbulence" may lead to new organization or to "disintegration and disorder," e.g., creation of a new species or extinction of an existing species. This goes beyond traditional Darwinian natural selection theory to propose change by random mutation and adaptation to propose "self-creative, emergent processes," for random mutation by itself should lead to disorder.
Another way to think of this is in the notion of "play" or "playful variation on old ideas," a breaking out of "rule-bound or goal-directed behavior." The point of it all is that it accounts for chaos and creation in purely naturalistic terms. No need for something higher or supernatural.
Another speculation is that "the spontaneous formation of new kinds of order might be explainable in terms of quantum coherence" as suggested by quantum theory. But Clarke doubts whether this applies or explains emergence. Self-organizing phenomena -- especially humans -- "are not strange in the way that quantum processes can be strange."
But is an explanation of emergence in sight? Probably not. It is likely that the current "unpredictability of emergent complexity" demonstrates the primitive state of our state of knowledge, or ignorance, rather than the way nature works.
Clarke raises the question whether emergence is "description" rather than "explanation," but then decides, with references to Newton and Einstein and Wittgenstein, that all science is description, the "how" rather than the "why." The "why" is for theology.
How does emergence relate to fundamental concepts of philsophy like "being?" Does emergence mean new levels of knowlege, or new levels of being. Clarke argues that emergence doesn't really fit any of the previous accounts of reality. It does not assume all the world is "matter," nor does it divide the world into two, material and mental. Clarke argues that
[Emergentism] runs counter to both monistic and dualist philosophies, and in their place offers instead a dynamic, process model in which being comes to be understood, not in terms of unchanging qualities or features or essences, nut rather of continual change punctuated by relative equilibrium.
But is he saying that emergence means something coming out of nothing? Not quite, he suggests: not "a "something for nothing" but a "more from less,"that the potential is there, but not yet realized.
What about God? Does not the concept of emergence suggest the present of a creative intelligence in the universe? Recently, the concept of "intelligent design" in nature has been advanced, and a number of people have questioned the adequacy of Darwinian evolution to accont for the "'irreducible complexity' of living beings." But Clarke would rather not go down that path.
We can now see that the astonishing coherence of the universe, clearly evident at many levels, is not a static or eternal one, but is a highly complex dynamic process, one in which harmony, disharmony, order, and chaos are complementary performers and transformers over deep time.
In other words, we don't know.